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SUMMARY In this paper, we survey the state of the art of the secure
key exchange method that is secured by the laws of classical statistical
physics, and involves the Kirchhoff's law and the generalized Johnson
noise equation, too. We discuss the major characteristics and
advantages of these schemes especially in comparison with quantum
encryption, and analyze some of the technical challenges of its
implementation, too. Finally, we outline some ideas about how to use
already existing and currently used wire lines, such as power lines,
phone lines, internet lines to implement unconditionally secure
information networks.
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1. Introduction: quanta of security and insecurity
This paper shall address some key arguments and
features related to the recent secure communication
scheme utilizing the laws of classical physics with the
specific goal to make secure wire-based information
networks possible.
Today, in the internet era, data communication security
is becoming one of the most important aspects of
everyday life; it is the essential requirement to function
while our computer is connected to the internet. Any one
of the following cases means absolute security:
a) The eavesdropper (Eve), basically, cannot physically
access the information channel. Tamper-resistant
line methods belong to this case (for example, see
[1]).
b) Eve has access and can do measurements on the
channel but the communicating parties (Alice and
Bob) already have a shared secret key, which they
can use for encryption.
c) Eve has access and can do measurements on the
channel but the laws of physics do not allow
extracting the communicated information from the
measurement data.
d) Eve can execute an invasive attack on the line and
she can potentially extract the communicated
information however, when that happens, she
disturbs the channel so much that Alice and Bob
discover the attack.
Tamper resistant lines [1] have been demonstrated by the
idea that the energy dissipation processes are occurring
at the nanoscale, not at the macroscale which is easily
tampered with. However, such a secure signal transfer is
demonstrated in nanoscale or nanophotonic devices [2],
not in Internet-scale system yet. Thus usually situation b)
is relevant for today's secure communications.
Consequently, the "key question" of security is: How to
share securely a secret key between Alice and Bob.
Accordingly, in today's software-based secure
communications, before the secure data exchange can
start, the two communicating parties (Alice and Bob)
must generate and share a joint secret (secure) encryption
key through the communication channel while the
eavesdropper (Eve) is supposedly monitoring the related
data (Figure 1) [3]. This is a mathematically impossible
task with current software methods. If a sufficient
calculation power is available for Eve, she can extract
the secure key and decrypt the communicated data with a
reasonable speed thus current software-based key
distribution scheme are only "computationally safe".
New algorithms and computing solutions are
continuously researched, including quantum computing
[4] and noise-based logic [5], therefore today's software-
based secure communication contains a potential time
bomb.
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Figure 1. Alice and Bob must generate and share a joint secure key
through the communication channel while the eavesdropper (Eve) is
monitoring the related data [3]. This is an impossible task with
currently used software-based methods.
Quantum key distribution [6] (Stephen Wiesner 1970's;
Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard 1984; Artur
Ekert 1990) has offered a solution, which is claimed to
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2be unconditionally secure, an expression indicating that
no reservations about Eve's computational limits are
made. The information bits are carried by single photons
(Figure 2). Here the no-cloning-theorem of quantum
physics is the theoretical foundation of security. It means
that a single photon cannot be copied without noise
(error). If Eve captures and measures the photon, it gets
destroyed and she must regenerate and reinject it into the
channel otherwise this bit will be considered invalid by
Alice and Bob. However, due to the no-cloning rule,
while Eve is doing that, she introduces noise and the
error rate in the channel will become greater than
without eavesdropping. Therefore, by evaluating the
error statistics, Alice and Bob will discover the
eavesdropping. And here is the weak point: statistics.
First of all, error statistics based eavesdropper detection
means that a large number of bits must be exchanged to
see deviations from the regular statistics. The security of
a single bit or a few bits is very poor. Secondly, statistics
based decision means that it can be a wrong decision and
the probability of correct decision, that is the probability
that the key exchange is indeed secure, is determined on
the invested resources and it can never be 100%. For
example, for the quantum intercept and resend attack
[6], the probability P  of uncovering Eve,
  P = 1? 0.75N < 1, where N is the number of bits in the
key. This is one example, where the classical physical
noise-based secure key exchange discussed below is
superior to quantum encryption.
Moreover, quantum communicators are vulnerable to the
advanced type of the man-in-the-middle-attack, where
Eve breaks the channel and installs two communicators.
With one of them she will communicate with Alice while
pretending that she is Bob, and with the other one she
will communicate with Bob while pretending that she is
Alice. This is another important example, where the
noise-based secure wire communicator discussed below
is superior to quantum encryption.
Quantum
communicator
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when the cloned photon is fed back.
Classical, public channel
Figure 2. Generic quantum communication arrangement [3]. To detect
the eavesdropper, a statistics of bit errors must be built. That requires a
sufficiently large number of bits.
Many quantum key exchangers have reportedly been
built [6], up to the range of 200 km. Most of them are
working through optical fibers and some of the most
advanced and secure ones are able to communicate via
air [6]. However, the security claim of quantum
encryption is mostly theoretical and experimental efforts
to crack quantum encryption have attracted only limited
efforts to date [7-9]. Nevertheless, these quantum
attacks, which are based on the non-idealities of building
elements and called "quantum hacking" have been
reported to be extremely successful [6-15]. This indicates
that much research and tests are yet to be carried out
with regard to the security of communications, and that
sufficient security and cost-effectiveness of quantum-
based methods have not yet been satisfactorily
established [7-15].
2. Classical physics offers a robust security solution
The main topic of this paper is the a secure key exchange
scheme introduced in 2005 [16,17] and
built/demonstrated in 2007 [18], which is utilizing the
robustness of classical information, stochasticity, and the
laws of classical physics to provide a security that, in
several aspects, looks superior to that of quantum
encryption. This scheme was named by its creators as
Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-Noise (KLJN) scheme
while on the internet has widely been nicknamed as Kish
cypher, Kish cipher, Kish's scheme, etc.
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Figure 3. The core of the KJLN secure key exchange system. In the
text below, the mathematical treatment utilizes the power density
spectra of the voltages and currents shown in the figure.
The KLJN scheme is a statistical-physical competitor of
quantum communicators and its security is based on (out
of Kirchhof's loop law) the Fluctuation-Dissipation
Theorem, more generally, on the Second Law of
Thermodynamics, indicating that the security of the
conceptual scheme is as strong as the impossibility of
building a perpetual motion machine (of the second
kind).
First we briefly survey the foundations of the KLJN
system [16,19]. Figure 3 shows the model of the
idealized KLJN cypher designed for secure key
exchange in [16]. The resistors RL and RH represent the
low, L (0), and high, H (1), bits, respectively. At each
clock period, Alice and Bob randomly choose one of the
resistors and connect it to the wire line. The situation LH
3or HL represents secure bit exchange [16], because Eve
cannot distinguish between them through measurements,
while LL and H H are insecure. The Gaussian voltage
noise generators (white noise with publicly agreed
bandwidth) represent a corresponding thermal noise at
publicly agreed effective temperatures 
  
Teff  (typically
  
Teff > 1 billion Kelvins [18]). According to the
Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem, the power density
spectra 
  
Su,L( f )  and   
Su,H ( f )  of the voltages   
U L,A(t)
and 
  
U L,B(t)  supplied by the voltage generators in   RL
and 
  
RH  are given by:
  
Su,L( f ) = 4kTeff RL   and    Su,H ( f ) = 4kTeff RH  (1)
respectively.
In the case of secure bit exchange (LH or HL situations),
the power density spectrum of channel voltage   U ch(t)
and channel current   I ch(t)  are given as (see [16,19] for
further details):
  
Su,ch( f ) = 4kTeff
RLRH
RL + RH
 , (2)
  
Si,ch(t) =
4kTeff
RL + RH
. (3)
Observe that during the LH or HL situation, due to linear
superposition, Equation-2 is the sum of the spectra of
two situations, i.e., when only the generator in 
  
RL  is
running:
  
SL,u,ch( f ) = 4kTeff RL
RH
RL + RH
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
2
        (4)
and when the generator in 
  
RH  is running:
  
SH,u,ch( f ) = 4kTeff RH
RL
RL + RH
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
2
(5)
The ultimate security of the system against passive
attacks is provided by the fact that the power 
  
PH?L  with
which resistor 
  
RH  is heating   RL  is equal to the power
  
PL?H  with which resistor   RL  is heating   RH  [16,19].
The proof can also be derived from Equation 3 for a
frequency bandwidth of   ?f  by:
  
PL?H =
SL,u,ch( f )?f
RH
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )
2
(6a)
  
PH?L =
SH,u,ch( f )?f
RL
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )
2
(6b)
The equality 
  
PH?L =  PL?H  (see Equations 6) is in
accordance with the Second Law of Thermodynamics;
violating this equality would mean not only violating
basic laws of physics and the ability to build a perpetual
motion machine (of the second kind), but also that the
eavesdropper (Eve) could utilize the voltage-current
crosscorrelation 
  
U ch(t)I ch(t)  to extract the bit [16].
However, 
  
U ch(t)I ch(t) = 0  thus Eve have insufficient
number of independent equations to determine the bit
location during the LH  or H L situation. The above
security proof against passive (listening) attacks, see
situation c) in the Introduction, holds only for Gaussian
noises, which have the well-known property that their
power density spectra or autocorrelation function
provides the maximal information about the noise and no
higher order distribution functions or other tools are able
to serve with additional information.
Any deviations from this circuitry, including parasitic
elements, inaccuracies, non-Gaussianity of the noise, etc.
will cause potential information leak toward Eve.
To provide unconditional security against invasive
attacks, including the man-in-the-middle attack, the fully
armed KLJN cypher system, see Figure 4, is monitoring
the instantaneous current and voltage values, at both
ends (i.e., Alice and also Bob) [17-19], and these values
are compared either via broadcasting them or via an
authenticated public channel. The alarm goes off
whenever the circuitry is changed or tampered with or
energy is injected into the channel. It is important to note
that these current and voltage data contain all the
information Eve can have. This implies that Alice and
Bob have full knowledge about the information Eve may
have; a particularly important property of the KLJN
system that can be utilized in secure key exchange.
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Public channel,  broadcasting  for comparing instantaneous local current (A) and voltage (V) data
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Figure 4. The KLJN wire communication arrangement. [3] To detect
the invasive eavesdropper (represented for example by the current
generator example at the middle), the instantaneous current and voltage
data at measured at the two ends are broadcasted and compared. The
eavesdropping is detected immediately, within a small fraction of the
4duration needed to transfer a single bit. Statistics of bit errors is not
needed. The exchange of even a single key bit is secure .
This situation implies the following important features of
the KLJN system [19]:
1. The KLJN system is always secure, even when it is
built with non-ideal elements, in the following sense.
The current and voltage data inform Alice and Bob about
the exact information leak. Hence, they can always
decide either to shot down the communication or to take
the risk.
2. Even when the communication is jammed by invasive
attacks or inherent non-idealities in the KLJN system,
the system remains secure because no information can be
eavesdropped by Eve without the full knowledge of
Alice and Bob about this potential incidence, and
without the full information Eve might have extracted,
see the full analysis by Horvath in [19].
3. The KLJN system is naturally and fully protected
against the man-in-the-middle attack [17], even during
the very first run of the operation when no hidden
signatures can be applied yet. This feature is provided by
the unique property of the KLJN system that zero bit
information can only be extracted during a man-in-the-
middle attack because the alarm goes off before the
exchange of a single key bit has taken place [17].
The outline of the prototype of the KLJN cypher [18] is
shown in Figure 5. The various non-idealities have been
addressed by different tools with the aim that the
information leak toward Eve due to non-idealities should
stay below 1% of the exchanged raw key bits. For the
KLJN cypher it was 0.19% for the most efficient attack
[18]. Here we briefly address two aspects of non-
idealities:
(i) The role of the line filter (and that of the band
limitation of the noise generator) is to provide the no-
wave limit in the cable that is to preserve the core
circuitry (see Figure 3) in the whole frequency band.
That is, the shortest wavelength component in the
driving noises should be much longer than the double of
the cable length in order to guarantee that no active wave
modes and related effects (e.g., reflection, invasive
attacks at high frequencies, etc.) take place in the cable.
(ii) Another tool to fight non-idealities is the cable
capacitance compensation (capacitor killer) arrangement
(see Figure 5). With practical cable parameters and their
limits, there is a more serious threat of the security: the
cable capacitance shortcuts part of the noise current and
that results in a greater current at the side of the lower
resistance end yielding an information leak. This effect
can be avoided by a cable-capacitor-killer [18] using the
inner wire of a coax cable as KLJN line while the outer
shield of the cable is driven by the same voltage as the
inner wire. However, this is done via a follower voltage
amplifier with zero output impedance. The outer shield
will then provide all the capacitive currents toward the
ground and the inner wire will experience zero parasitic
capacitance. Without capacitor killer arrangement and
practical bare-wire line parameters, the recommended
upper limit of cable length is much shorter depending on
the driving resistor values  RL and RH .
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Figure 5. A practical KLJN cypher [18]. Double-ended arrows
symbolize computer control.
3. Security proofs and attacks
The idealistic system is absolutely secure but real
systems are rarely idealistic. Several hacking attack types
were published based on the non-ideality of circuit
elements causing deviations from the idealistic circuitry;
see discussions in [20-25]. Each of these attacks
triggered a relevant security proof that showed the
efficiency of the defense mechanism (see Figure 4).
Also, all attack types were experimentally tested by
Mingesz et al [18] and the theoretical security proofs
were experimentally confirmed. At practical conditions,
the most effective attack utilized non-zero wire
resistance, even though in that paper [20] by Scheuer and
Yariv, calculation errors were made and the real effect
was 100 times weaker, as shown later by Kish and
Scheuer [21]. Other attack types of practically less
significance were by: Hao [23], based on differences in
noise temperatures (theoretical response: [24],
experimental one: [18]); Mingesz et al. [18] and Kish
[24], using deviations of resistance values of the resistor
pairs at the two ends, Kish et al. [19], using wire
capacitance and inductance (response in [19]); and Liu
[25], exploiting delay effects (response: [19]). The level
of allowed information leak is the choice of Alice and
Bob and its actual value is given by the invested
resources to reach ideality and it depends on how much
speed is given up for that purpose. In the experimental
demo [18] the strongest leak was due to wire resistance,
where 0.19% of the bits leaked out to Eve and the
fidelity of key exchange was 99.98%. This is a very good
raw bit leak, which can be completely removed by a
5simple privacy amplification. [26].
4. Privacy amplification
Privacy amplification is a technique to ensure the
security of an encryption scheme of which the key has
been partially exposed. Horvath, et al [26] studied a
simple privacy amplification: XOR-ing subsequent pairs
of the key bits, thereby halving the key length, while
exponentially reducing the information leak. They found
that in contrast to quantum key distribution schemes, the
high fidelity of the raw key generated in the KLJN
system allows the users to always sift a secure shorter
key if they have an upper bound on the eavesdropper
probability to correctly guess the exchanged key bits.
The number of privacy amplification iterations needed to
achieve information leak of less than 10
-8
 in the case of
the 0.19% information leak is two, resulting in a
corresponding slowdown by a factor of four.
5. Securing computers and hardware
An important advantage [27] of the KLJN method, that is
impossible to achieve with quantum communicators is
that the KLJN circuitry can be integrated on computer
chips to provide secure key exchange for secure data
communication between hardware units within a
computer. Due to the short wires in a computer, the main
non-idealities [19] (wire resistance, inductance and
capacitance) are negligible, thus the key exchange can
run under idealistic conditions to provide unconditional
security without further processing [27], such as privacy
amplification.
6. High-speed secure key distribution over chain
networks
In [28], instead of point-to-point secure key exchange, a
high efficiency, secure chain network was proposed.
Each agent had two KLJN systems and one was used to
do exchange in the left direction in the chain and the
other one in the right direction. The whole network
consists of two parallel networks: i) the chain-like
network for secure key exchange with left and right
neighbors; and ii) a regular non-secure internet network
with a Coordinator-server. The protocol provides a
teleportation-type multiple telecloning of the key bit
because the information transfer can take place without
the actual presence/recognition of the information bit at
the intermediate points of the chain network. At the point
where telecloning takes place, the clone is created by the
product of a bit coming from the regular network and a
secure bit from the local KLJN ciphers. For details see
[28].
7. Utilizing wire lines in use: power lines, phone lines,
etc [29]
Since existing wires, such as power lines connect all
buildings, apartments and offices, they have great
potential to be utilized for secure key exchange through
the KLJN method. However, there is a problem: as we
have seen in Section 2, to maintain security and to avoid
that the voltage/current alarm goes off, the core circuitry
of the KJLN secure key exchange system must be
preserved. When we plan to utilize existing lines for
realizing secure key distribution over networks, filters
can be used to create distinct isolated regions of the wire
that can be used for the core circuitry. Without the
limitation of generality, the examples below will utilize
power lines for this purpose.
7.1 The filter method for single lines
Figure 6 [29] shows an example that uses a KLJN
frequency Band Excluder (BE) and Band Pass (BP)
filters to preserve a single Kirchhoff loop’s
characteristics in the KLJN frequency band between two
KLJN communicators with one intersection between
them. Both, the original non-KLJN load (power
consumer, phone, or internet card represented by RN) and
the KLJN communicators will work using their own,
non-overlapping frequency bands. BE excludes the
KLJN frequency band and passes all other important
frequencies. BP passes the KLJN frequency band and
excludes all other frequencies. BP filters must be used in
any case at the communicator outputs to avoid transient
and eavesdropping probing signals out of the KLJN
band.
Figure 6.  Example for how to use KLJN frequency Band Excluder
(BE) and Band Pass (BP) filters to preserve a single Kirchhoff loop in
the KLJN frequency band between two KLJN communicators with one
intersection between them [29]. Thick (blue, non-numbered) lines:
original line current; thin (red, non-numbered) lines: KLJN current;
thick (green) lines 1 and 3: both types of currents.
6Figure 7 shows that, though the topology in Figure 6
may look complex, the circuitry in the Line Filter Box in
Figure 6 can be contained by a box with only three
electrodes. If there is more than one consumer along the
line between the communicators, each of them must be
fed via a separate Line Filter Box.
Figure 7. The line filter box (see Figure 1) should be installed at each
intersection of the line to separate the non-KLJN communicator loads
from the KLJN frequency band [29].
7.2 Ground-level method with 3-phase power lines
In the case of 3-phase power lines [29], we can make use
of the fact that, in the idealized case, when the load is
symmetric on the phases, there is no current flowing
from the common point of the 3-phase transformers to
the ground. Then the KLJN communicators can be
connected between the common points of the 3-phase
transformers and the ground, see Figure 8. This
arrangement can help to reduce the problem of working
with high voltages because the common point of the
transformers is at ground potential in the idealized case.
Figure 8. Communication via idealized 3-phase power lines with
symmetric loads of the 3-phase transformers at Power Stations A and
B, respectively [29].
However, in practice, there are non-idealities and
asymmetries among the lines (load, phase, etc.) therefore
filters will be necessary to avoid problems. Figure 9
shows a possible solution of such problems. In the KLJN
frequency range the filters drive the current through the
communicators and out of that frequency range the
current goes into the ground. Note, if there is an
intersection of cables with asymmetric loads between
Power Stations A and B then filters must be used
similarly to Figure 6 and then the problems with high
voltages cannot be avoided. Therefore, the arrangements
in Figures 8 and 9 are most advantageous when there is
no intersection between the two power stations.
Figure 9. A more robust version [29] of the scheme shown in Figure 8.
Summary
After introducing the basic concept and characteristics of
the KLJN key exchange, we focused on the practically
important aspect of utilizing existing wire lines, such as
power lines. We have shown with some simple circuit
demonstrations that the KLJN units can use existing
wires for communication. The filter method can also be
used with phone and internet lines and for getting the
KLJN current around switchers and multiplexer units.
The concrete realization and further development of
these ideas is straightforward, though not trivial, but we
will not go in details since it is out of the scope of the
present paper.
Finally, we must answer the following questions. Is the
communication still secure if the eavesdropper removes
a filter or if a non-filtered new intersection is made on
the line? The answer is straightforward: the
communication becomes non-secure; however the
current-voltage alarm system (see Figure 4), which is
comparing the KLJN voltages and currents at the two
units, will go off and the communication will
immediately be terminated for security reasons.
Therefore the eavesdropper cannot extract any useful bits
of information.
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